Yale University

EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

Cowles Foundation

5-1-2001

Default and Punishment in General Equilibrium
Pradeep Dubey
John Geanakoplos
Martin Shubik

Follow this and additional works at: https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/cowles-discussion-paper-series
Part of the Economics Commons

Recommended Citation
Dubey, Pradeep; Geanakoplos, John; and Shubik, Martin, "Default and Punishment in General Equilibrium"
(2001). Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers. 1559.
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/cowles-discussion-paper-series/1559

This Discussion Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Cowles Foundation at EliScholar – A
Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale. It has been accepted for inclusion in Cowles Foundation
Discussion Papers by an authorized administrator of EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at
Yale. For more information, please contact elischolar@yale.edu.

DEFAULT AND PUNISHMENT IN GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM

By
Pradeep Dubey, John Geanakoplos and Martin Shubik

May 2002

COWLES FOUNDATION DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 1304R

COWLES FOUNDATION FOR RESEARCH IN ECONOMICS
YALE UNIVERSITY
Box 208281
New Haven, Connecticut 06520-8281

http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/
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Abstract
We extend the standard model of general equilibrium with incomplete markets to allow for default and punishment. The equilibrating variables include
expected delivery rates, along with the usual prices of assets and commodities.
By reinterpreting the variables, our model encompasses a broad range of adverse selection, and signalling phenomena (including the Akerlof lemons model
and Rothschild—Stiglitz insurance model) and some moral hazard problems in a
general equilibrium framework.
Despite earlier claims about the nonexistence of equilibrium with adverse
selection, we show that equilibrium always exists.
We show that more lenient punishment which encourages default may be
Pareto improving because it allows for better risk spreading.
We deÞne an equilibrium reÞnement that requires expected delivery rates for
untraded assets to be reasonably optimistic. Default, in conjunction with this
reÞnement, opens the door to a theory of endogenous assets. The market can
choose default penalties and quantity constraints on sellers.
Keywords: default, incomplete markets, adverse selection, moral hazard, equilibrium reÞnement, endogenous assets

∗

This work is supported in part by NSF Grant DMS 8705294 and SES—881205. The Þrst version of
this paper appeared as Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper #773, in 1990. That version, containing
essentially the basic model and Theorems 1 and 2 from this paper, was never published, though our
model has been frequently used and cited: see, for example, Zame (1993). An expanded version,
of which this paper is a part, was circulated in 1994, and again as a Cowles Foundation Discussion
Paper No. 1241 in 2000.

1

Introduction

There is a substantial amount of default in the American economy. At Þrst glance
this would seem to be a sign of disequilibrium, and to call for economic models
that radically depart from the orthodox paradigm of general equilibrium and market
clearing.
Indeed, general equilibrium theory has for the most part not made room for
default. In the Arrow—Debreu model of general equilibrium with complete contingent
markets (GE), and likewise in the general equilibrium model with incomplete markets
(GEI), agents keep all their promises by assumption. More speciÞcally, in the GE
model, agents never promise to deliver more goods than they personally own. In
the GEI model, the deÞnition of equilibrium (that has been developed in a rapidly
growing literature) allows agents to promise more of some goods than they themselves
have, provided they are sure to get the diﬀerence elsewhere. Agents there too must
honor their commitments, though no longer exclusively out of their own endowments.
Each agent can keep his promises because other agents keep their promises to him.
We build a model that explicitly allows for default, but is broad enough to incorporate conventional general equilibrium theory as a special case. We call the model
GE(R, λ, Q) because each asset j is deÞned by its promise Rj , the penalty rate λj
which determines the punishment for default on the promise, and the quantity restriction Qj attendant on those who sell it.
Fixing exogenously the set A of tradeable assets,
A = {(Rj , λj , Qj ) : (Rj , λj , Qj ) is tradeable},
we solve for equilibrium E(A). The equilibrating variables include anticipated delivery rates on assets, along with the usual prices of assets and commodities.
One of the central features of our model is that assets are thought of as pools.
Diﬀerent sellers of the same asset will typically default in diﬀerent events, and in
diﬀerent proportions. The buyers of the asset receive a pro rata share of all the
diﬀerent sellers’ deliveries, just as an investor does today in the securitized mortgage
market, or in the securitized credit card market. Pooling drastically reduces the
information processing and transactions costs of trading assets, which explains its
increasing prevalence in modern economies.
Just as buyers of commodities are assumed in perfect competition to regard prices
as Þxed, so we assume that buyers of assets regard default rates as Þxed. Our general
equilibrium model thus stands in contrast to models in which a single lender and a
single borrower negotiate with each other. We have avoided a Þnite-player, gametheoretic treatment of default because, for the massive anonymous Þnancial markets
on which we focus attention, perfect competition is a better approximation to reality,
and much more analytically tractable.
We have also avoided a (perfectly competitive but) partial equilibrium treatment
of our subject because we wanted to evaluate the system-wide consequences of default.
In a world in which promises can exceed physical endowments, each default can begin
a chain reaction. A creditor in one market where payment does not occur is deprived
1

of the means of delivery in another market where he is the debtor, thereby causing a
further default in some other market, etc. The indirect eﬀects of default might be as
important as the direct eﬀects, but they are missed in partial equilibrium models. We
emphasize that these chain reactions occur exclusively in economies with intermediate
levels of Þnancial development, such as the system now in place in the United States.
Once the asset markets become complete, the system of interlocking debts will be
broken, as in the GE model, and no chain reactions will occur.
Another central feature of our model is that the subset A∗ ≡ A∗ (E(A)) ⊂ A of
actively traded assets
A∗ = {(Rj , λj , Qj ) ∈ A : (Rj , λj , Qj ) is positively traded in E(A)}
also emerges in equilibrium. The promises, penalties, and sales limitations corresponding to actively traded assets can thus themselves be regarded as endogenous.
A crucial role in the endogenous determination of asset trade is played by the
expectations agents have over the deliveries of assets that are not positively traded.
(In game theoretic terms, this is analogous to beliefs oﬀ the equilibrium path.) We
Þx these expectations for non-traded assets at reasonable levels by a straightforward
equilibrium reÞnement. The idea is to introduce an external ε-agent who sells ε
units of each asset and fully delivers, and to take the limit as ε → 0. This rules out
irrational pessimism on expected deliveries from untraded assets. The simplicity of
the reÞnement is due to our hypothesis of perfect competition consistently applied.1
Endogenous default necessarily involves adverse selection and moral hazard. Indeed we note that the adverse selection and signalling phenomena described by Akerlof (1972), Spence (1973), and Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) can all be captured
in our perfectly competitive framework.
Our Þrst goal is to show that if agents have the mental powers to anticipate
future rates of default (contingent on future events), just as they are presumed by
conventional equilibrium theory to have the mental powers to anticipate future prices
(contingent on future events), then default is consistent with the orderly function of
markets. In Section 5 we prove the existence of equilibrium with default under exactly
the same conditions necessary to prove the existence of equilibrium in the GEI model
(where default is ruled out by assumption.) More precisely, we show that our reÞned
equilibrium E(A) exists for every collection A of assets (R, λ, Q) for which Q < ∞,
or for which Q = ∞ but the promises R are all paid in the same numeraire.
Our second goal is to give a purely economic explanation for lenient default penalties. When markets are incomplete, default allows agents to tailor-make promises into
deliveries that suit them best. In eﬀect they can replace the given assets by more
appropriate assets. Second, the span of the asset deliveries can be made much larger
than the span of the asset promises, since a single given asset can be made into as
many diﬀerent assets as there are sellers, if diﬀerent sellers default diﬀerently on the
same promises.
1

To the best of our knowledge, this appears to be the Þrst analogue of the “trembling hand”
reÞnement of game theory in perfectly competitive equilibrium.
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Our Þnal goal is to show that even in a world without trading costs, assets are
endogenous. Whereas in GEI the selection of assets is usually regarded as outside the
model, here we can resolve the asset selection problem by focusing on the endogenous
determination of positively traded assets A∗ . Typically in GEI, every (nonredundant)
asset is actively traded, so A = A∗ . However, in equilibrium with default, there will
typically be many assets in A\A∗ which are priced by the market, but neither bought
nor sold.2 The reason is that with default, the sale of an asset is not the negative
of its purchase. The buyer receives only what is delivered, but the seller gives up
in addition penalties for what is not delivered. The marginal utility of buying may
thus be strictly less than the marginal disutility of selling, leaving room for a price
in between at which no agent will want to buy or sell.
Recall that each asset (Rj , λj , Qj ) is characterized by three dimensions. If the set
A of available assets is comprehensive (i.e., all conceivable levels and combinations
of the three asset dimensions are present in A), then we prove in Section 9 that A∗
will in eﬀect select the Arrowian levels: completely spanning promises, with inÞnite
penalties, and nonbinding quantity constraints. On the other hand, if two of the
dimensions in A are exogenously restricted away from their Arrowian levels, then
the forces of supply and demand will endogenously select the levels in the remaining
dimensions in A∗ to be far from Arrowian, as we show in Sections 10 and 11.
For example, suppose promises and quantity constraints are Þxed exogenously as
in Section 7, where we showed that optimal penalties should be intermediate. We can
ask how harsh the penalties will be that endogenously emerge in A∗ . We Þnd that
the forces of supply and demand do select a unique penalty, which in the example
turns out to be optimal.
We show that if promises and penalties are Þxed exogenously in a particular way,
our model includes the insurance contracts of Akerlof (1972) and Rothschild—Stiglitz
(1976). In that case A∗ endogenously selects quantity limits Qj . This enables us
to show how the phenomenon of signalling can be treated in perfect competition,
moreover without jeopardizing the existence of equilibrium.

Default in Equilibrium: The GE(R, λ, Q) Model

2
2.1

The Economy

As in the canonical model of general equilibrium with incomplete markets (GEI), we
consider a two-period economy, where agents know the present but face an uncertain
future. In period 0 (the present) there is just one state of nature (called state 0), in
which H agents trade in L commodities and J assets. Then chance moves and selects
one of S states which occur in period 1 (the future). Commodity trades take place
again, and assets pay oﬀ. The diﬀerence from GEI is that in our GE(R, λ, Q) model,
assets pay oﬀ in accordance with what agents opt to deliver. Our notation for the
exogenous variables is:
2

In some applications we might choose to limit A exogenously; the point is that even if A is
inclusive, A∗ will still be limited.
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` ∈ L = {1, ..., L} = set of commodities
s ∈ S = {1, ..., S} = set of states in period 1
S ∗ = {0} ∪ S = set of all states
h ∈ H = {1, ..., H} = set of agents
∗
eh ∈ RS+ ×L = initial endowment of agent h
j ∈ J = {1, ..., J} = set of assets
= promises per unit of asset j of each commodity ` ∈ L in each state
Rj ∈ RS×L
+
s∈S
S ∗ ×L
h
→ R = utility function of agent h
u : R+
λhsj ∈ R+ ≡ R+ ∪ {∞} = real default penalty on agent h for asset j in state s
Qhj ∈ R+ = bound on sale of asset j by agent h
We assume that no agent has the null endowment, and that all named commodities
are present in the aggregate, i.e.,
ehs = (ehs1 , ..., ehsL ) 6= 0
for all h ∈ H and s ∈ S ∗ , and
es` =

X

ehs` > 0

h∈H

for all s` ∈ S ∗ × L. Also each uh is continuous, concave and strictly increasing in
each of its S ∗ × L variables. Having assumed strict monotonicity and concavity, there
is no further loss of generality in assuming that uh (x) → ∞ whenever ||x||∞ → ∞.3
We can visualize the state space as a simple tree:
s=1

s=0

s=S

Figure 1
Agents h have heterogeneous, state-dependent endowments ehs ∈ RL
+ and disutilities of default λhsj .
P
∗L
∗L
Let ¤ = {x ∈ RS
: ||x||∞ ≤ 2|| h eh ||∞ }. Let L be the set of aﬃne functions L : RS
→R
+
+
such that L(x) ≥ uh (x) for all x ∈ ¤. DeÞne ũh (x) ≡ inf L∈L L(x). Then equilibrium with uh and
ũh coincide, and ũh has the desired properties.
3
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Adverse selection enters the picture because agents have diﬀerent endowments
out of which to keep their promises, and also diﬀerent disutilities of default.
Promises must be of a limited kind j ∈ J Þxed a priori. A promise j ∈ J speciÞes
bundles of goods (or services) to be delivered in each state:
 
} − state 1 goods
  } − state 2 goods

Promise Rj = 
 
} − state S goods.

Agents h make promises by selling various quantities ϕhj of each asset j. An
agent’s ability to keep a promise depends on how many promises he sells, both of
the same kind j, and of other kinds j 0 6= j. Moral hazard enters the picture, since
a buyer of an asset (i.e., lender) does not know which other promises the seller (i.e.,
borrower) has made, and because borrowers have the option to default.
Each kind of asset prescribes a limit on its sale, ϕhj ≤ Qhj . Limits on sales of
promises are necessary to any realistic model of credit.4 If Qhj = 0, then agent h is
essentially forbidden from selling asset j. If the limits Qhj are very large, they may
be entirely irrelevant, as they mostly are in the examples of Sections 7 and 8.5 But
if they are small, then they may be used as a signal that the sellers are not making
many promises, and hence that the promises are reliable. We explore signalling in
example B1.
An economy is deÞned as a vector
µ
´ ¶
³
h h
h
h
.
E = (u , e )h∈H , Rj , ((λsj )s∈S , Qj )h∈H
j∈J

Note again that an asset consists of promises, penalties for default, and limits on
sales.

2.2
2.2.1

Equilibrium
Macro Variables and Individual Choice Variables

Let us deÞne
∗
p ∈ RS++×L = commodity prices
π ∈ RJ+ = asset prices
K ∈ [0, 1]S×J = expected delivery rates on assets
S ∗ ×L
= consumption of h
xh ∈ R+
h
J
θ ∈ R+ = asset purchases of h
ϕh ∈ RJ+ = asset sales of h
(S×L)×J
= deliveries by agent h on asset j ∈ J
Dh ∈ R+
4
Evidence abounds that Þnite bounds are always imposed in the extension of credit. Even the
best “name” among borrowers has a limited credit line.
5
In Section 5 we are able to prove the existence of equilibrium even when Qhj = ∞, provided
λ À 0 and the Rj all deliver in the same good.
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In conventional general equilibrium theory, market prices (p, π) convey all relevant
information (trade is anonymous).
The possibility of default forces us add delivery rates K as macro variables
In our model, an agent h buys θhj shares of asset pool j and sells ϕhj promises into
the same pool. Diﬀerent sellers h and h̃ may deliver diﬀerently, Djh 6= Djh̃ , but their
promises cannot be distinguished. We suppose that buyers and sellers do not trade
bilaterally, but through the anonymous pool. The buyers (shareholders) of pool j
receive a pro rata share of all its diﬀerent sellers’ deliveries. Each share of pool j
delivers the fraction
P
h
h∈H ps · Dsj
Ksj = P
h
h∈H ps · Rsj ϕj

of its promises ps · Rsj in state s. The shareholder of pool j does not know, or need
to know, the identities of the sellers or the quantities of their sales. All that matters
to him is the price π j of the share and the delivery rate Ksj .
Pooling dramatically reduces the information needed to buy a diversiÞed portfolio
h for many diﬀerent individuals
of risks: instead of forecasting individual deliveries Ksj
h, a buyer need only concern himself with a single average delivery Ksj . Figuring
h for one individual is typically no less diﬃcult than estimating K for a pool
out Ksj
sj
with a large population. Thus pooling overcomes the costly information processing
problems inherent in multiple bilateral negotiations, and is one reason why it is
becoming so prevalent in modern economies.
The pooling also leads to adverse selection, since a buyer must worry that unreliable sellers with a proclivity for lower deliveries will tend to sell more promises
into the pool, worsening the anticipated rate Ksj . Signalling, by publicly committing
oneself to a small quantity of sales, therefore has an important role to play, because
it suggests to the buyer that deliveries may be more reliable. To incorporate it in our
model, we suppose that there are many pools j, each with its own quantity limit Qj
imposed on sales into the pool. This opens up the opportunity for agents to signal
their restraint by selling into a pool with low Qj .
By enabling each agent to trade anonymously as part of a large aggregate, pooling
already takes us part of the way toward perfect competition. We fully get there by
postulating that all agents view (p, π, K) as Þxed. Perfect competition thus further
reduces the information a buyer requires: there is no need for him to forecast how
the delivery rate at any pool would vary if the price were changed, since he can’t
change the price.
The terms (Rj , ((λhsj )s∈S , Qhj )h∈H ) of pool j are set exogenously, just as the location, date, and quality of a commodity are in traditional general equilibrium theory.
The prices π j , the anticipated delivery rates Ksj , and the trades at each pool j are all
determined endogenously at equilibrium by the market forces of supply and demand.

6

2.2.2

Household Budget and Payoﬀ

The budget set B h (p, π, K) of agent h is given by:
(
B h (p, π, K) =

∗ ×L

S
(x, θ, ϕ, D) ∈ R+

J×S×L
× RJ+ × RJ+ × R+
:

p0 · (x0 − eh0 ) + π · (θ−ϕ) ≤ 0; ϕj ≤ Qhj for j ∈ J; and, ∀s ∈ S,


X
X
ps · Dsj ≤
θj Ksj ps · Rsj
ps · (xs − ehs ) +

j∈J

j∈J

The budget set allows agent h to deliver whatever he pleases. On the other
hand, the agent expects to receive a fraction Ksj of the promises made to him on
asset j in state s. The Þrst constraint says that agent h cannot spend more on
purchases of commodities x0 and assets θ than the revenue he receives from the sale
of commodities eh0 and assets ϕ. Moreover he can never sell more than Qhj of any
asset j. The second constraint applies separately in each state s ∈ S. It says that
agent h cannot spend more on the purchase of commodities xs and asset deliveries
P
h
j Dsj in state
P s than the revenue he gets in state s from commodity sales es and
asset receipts j θj Ksj ps Rsj .
The only reason that agents deliver anything on their promises is that they feel a
disutility λhsj from defaulting. The payoﬀ of (x, θ, ϕ, D) given prices p, to agent h is
wh (x, θ, ϕ, D, p) = uh (x) −

X X λhsj [ϕj ps · Rsj − ps · Dsj ]+
.
ps · vs
j∈J s∈S

+
where vs ∈ RL
+ is exogenously speciÞed with vs 6= 0. Note that [ϕj ps ·Rsj −ps ·Dsj ] ≡
max{0, ϕj ps · Rsj − ps · Dsj } is exactly the money value of the default of h on his
promise to deliver on asset j in state s.

3

Default Penalties

Once we allow for default it is evident that society has much to gain from punishing
those agents who fail to keep their promises. In a multiperiod world, market forces
themselves might provide some incentive to keep promises, since agents who acquired
a bad reputation for previous defaults might Þnd it more diﬃcult to obtain new
loans. Collateral is also a very important device for guaranteeing at least partial
payment (see Geanakoplos, 1997); but here we ignore it. For reasons of simplicity and
tractability, we conÞne attention to a two period model with exogenously speciÞed
default penalties which are increasing in the size of the default. These penalties
might be interpreted as the sum of third party punishment such as prison terms,
pangs of conscience, (unmodeled) reputation losses, and (unmodeled) garnishing of
future income.
Default in our model can either be strategic or due to ill fortune. Penalties are
imposed on agents who fail to deliver, whatever the cause. Debtors choose whether
7

to repay or to bear the penalty for defaulting; creditors cannot observe why default
occurs. Agents who have no resources to repay will be punished as severely as they
would if they had the resources but chose not to repay.6 The consequences of default
penalties are therefore two-fold: they tend to induce agents to keep promises when
they are able, and they tend to discourage agents from making promises that they
know in advance they will not always be able to keep.
Although in practice the severity of the penalty (e.g., a felony vs. a misdemeanor)
depends on the nominal amount, and that is only adjusted slowly in the face of
inßation, we suppose the adjustment is instantaneous, so that the penalties depend
on the “real” default. Accordingly, we divide nominal defaults by the market price
in state s of a Þxed basket of goods vs .
Notice that the budget set is convex, and the payoﬀ function wh is concave, in
the household choice variables (x, θ, ϕ, D). Had we expressed these choices with other
(apparently natural) variables, such as δ hsj ≡ delivery per unit promised, the budget
set would no longer be convex, nor would wh be concave.
It is worth noting a scaling property of the budget set (which is immediate from
its deÞnition and the fact that ehs 6= 0 and ps À 0 for all s ∈ S ∗ ): (x, θ, ϕ, D) ∈
B h (p, π, K) and 0 < α < 1 ⇒ (αx, αθ, αϕ, αD) ∈ B h (p0 , π 0 , K 0 ) for all (p0 , π 0 , K 0 )
suﬃciently close to (p, π, K). This property will often be useful to us.7
For simplicity (and for the facility of doing comparative statics) we have taken
the default penalty to be linear and separable in the amount of default.8 But we can
easily accommodate more general payoﬀs wh which allow for the marginal rate of
substitution between goods to depend on the level of default. All that is needed for
Theorem 1 is the continuity and concavity of wh . For Theorem 2 we need to assume,
in addition, that given any x, wh (x, θ, ϕ, D, p) < uh (eh ) if the default in any state,
on any asset, is suﬃciently large.
One could easily imagine a legal system that imposes penalties that are discontinuous in the size of the default, for example trigger penalties that jump to a minimum
level at the Þrst inÞnitesimal default. Our model does not explicitly allow for these
possibilities. But as we show in our working paper [–], with a continuum of households, such modiÞcations to the default penalties do not destroy the existence of
equilibrium.
We shall also analyze default with netting, transactions costs, and conÞscation,
which make for nonconvex budget sets, or nonconcave payoﬀs. Then it becomes necessary to introduce a continuum of households. We defer this discussion to Sections
6, 8, and 12.
6

In our model default penalties do not distinguish fraud from ill fortune. In reality they are hard
to separate, but ever since Las siete Partitas of Don Alfonso X “the wise,” bankruptcy law has sought
to distinguish them.
7
An alternative scaling property, also satisÞed by the budget set, is obtained if we replace
(αx, αθ, αϕ, αD) with (αx, αθ, ϕ, αD). Our entire analysis remains intact with this version of scaling.
8
See Shubik—Wilson (1977).
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3.0.3

Market Clearing

We are now in a position to deÞne a GE(R, λ, Q) equilibrium. It is a list hp, π, K, (xh , θh ,
ϕh , Dh )h∈H i such that (1) to (4) below hold.
(1) For h ∈ H, (xh , θh , ϕh , Dh ) ∈ arg max wh (x, θ, ϕ, D, p) over B h (p, π, K)
P
h
h
(2)
h∈H (x − e ) = 0
P
h
h
(3)
h∈H (θ − ϕ ) = 0
(P
P
P
h
h
h
h∈H ps · Dsj /
h∈H ps · Rsj ϕj , if
h∈H ps · Rsj ϕj > 0
(4) Ksj =
P
h
arbitrary,
if
h∈H ps · Rsj ϕj = 0

Condition (1) says that all agents optimize; (2) and (3) require commodity and
asset markets to clear. Condition (4), together with the deÞnition of the budget set,
says that each potential lender (i.e., buyer) of an asset is correct in his expectation
about the fraction of promises that do in fact get delivered. Moreover, his expectation
h = K
Ksj
sj of the rate of delivery does not depend on anything he does himself; in
particular, it does not depend on the amount θhj he loans (i.e., purchases) of the asset.
Every lender gets the same rate of delivery.
Since heterogeneous borrowers may be selling the same asset, the realized rate of
delivery Ksj is an average of the rates of delivery of each of the borrowers, weighted
by the quantity of their sales. It might well happen that those borrowers with the
highest rates of default are selling most of the asset, and this is the adverse selection
and moral hazard that rational lenders must forecast.
We believe that our deÞnition of GE(R, λ, Q) equilibrium embodies the spirit of
perfect, anonymous competition, and represents a signiÞcant fraction of the mass
asset markets of a modern enterprise economy.
In the next sections we investigate the properties of equilibrium.

3.1

Untraded Assets

It is a curious fact that many of the large asset markets that our model seeks to
describe have been initiated not by entrepreneurs but by government intervention.
The government, for example, began the GNMA mortgage program by guaranteeing
delivery on the promises of all borrowers eligible for the program (but not the timing9 of delivery). It is likely, however, that these mortgage markets would function
smoothly even without government guarantees. Private companies indeed do sell
insurance on non-GNMA mortgages. A reasonable question to ask is why the pass
through mortgage market did not begin on its own?
One possible explanation is provided by our model. When assets are traded, expected deliveries Ksj must be equal to actual deliveries. Expectations cannot therefore be unduly pessimistic. But for assets that are not traded, our model makes no
9

A default induces the government to prepay the loan immediately, even if the lender would prefer
the scheduled payments.

9

assumption about expectations of delivery (see (4)). In the real world, investors with
no experience in observing default rates might tend to overestimate their probability.
This can create serious problems, in practice as in our model. In the model, so far,
there is nothing to stop the expectations from being absurdly pessimistic, which in
turn will support trivial equilibria with no trade in the asset. The point is easily
seen by a simple example. Consider an equilibrium of an economy in which certain
assets are missing. Introduce these new assets j but choose their prices π j close to
zero. Then no agent will be willing to sell them, for he gets very little in exchange,
but undertakes a relatively large obligation either to deliver commodities or to pay
default penalties. Also choose the Ksj to be positive but even smaller. Then in spite
of their low price, no agent will be willing to buy the assets since he expects them to
deliver virtually nothing. Thus we have obtained trivial equilibria in which there is
no trade of the new assets on account of arbitrarily pessimistic expectations regarding
their deliveries.10
We believe that unreasonable pessimism prevents many real world markets from
opening, and provides an important role for government intervention. But it is interesting to study equilibrium in which expectations are always reasonably optimistic.
It is of central importance for us to understand which markets are open and which are
not, and we do not want our answer to depend on the agents’ whimsical pessimism.

3.2

ReÞned Equilibrium

Expectations for deliveries by assets that are not traded are analogous to beliefs in
game theory “oﬀ the equilibrium path.” Selten (1975) dealt with the game theory
problem by forcing every agent to tremble and play all his strategies with probability
at least ε > 0, and then letting ε → 0. We shall also invoke a tremble, but in quite a
diﬀerent spirit. Our tremble will be “on the market” and not on households’ (players’)
strategies. Indeed, no household could tremble the way we want: we introduce an
external player who delivers more per unit than any of the real households.11 This
extraordinary delivery is what banishes whimsical pessimism.
Consider external ε-agent who sells and buys ε = (εj )j∈J À 0 of every asset, and
fully delivers on his promises. (One might interpret this agent as a government which
guarantees delivery on the Þrst inÞnitesimal promises.)
An equilibrium E(ε) obtained with the ε-agent is called an ε-trembling hand
equilibrium. Thus any such E(ε) = hp(ε), π(ε), K(ε), (xh (ε), θh (ε), ϕh (ε), Dh (ε))h∈H i
must satisfy:
10

In the strategic market games literature it has been observed that markets can be arbitrarily
shut because each agent expects that no other agent will go there, and hence does not go himself.
But those markets are truly activated simply by announcing any price there: a low price will attract
buyers and a high price will attract sellers. Except for degenerate cases, no price will eliminate all
buying and selling. But as we saw in our thought example, it is always possible to announce (π, K)
in such a way that eliminates all buying and selling. The purpose of our reÞnement is to pin down
appropriate levels of (π, K). In strategic market games an external agent was introduced whose sole
purpose was to trade. In this paper, the external agent must trade and deliver fully.
11
Were we to invoke a tremble on strategies, e.g., forcing each household t to contribute ε > 0 to
every pool, this would not meet our needs.

10

(1∗ ) (xh (ε), θh (ε), ϕh (ε), Dh (ε)) ∈ arg max wh (x, θ, ϕ, D, p(ε)) over B h (p(ε), π(ε), K(ε))

0
if s = 0
 X
X
(2∗ )
(xhs (ε) − ehs ) =
εj (1 − Ksj (ε))Rsj if s ∈ S

h∈H

(3∗ )

X

h∈H

j∈J

(θh (ε) − ϕh (ε)) = 0

X

h (ε)
ps (ε) · Rsj εj +
ps (ε) · Dsj




h∈H

X
∗
(4 ) Ksj (ε) = ps (ε) · Rsj εj +
ps (ε) · Rsj ϕhj (ε)



h∈H


1

if denominator > 0 (Rsj 6= 0)
otherwise (Rsj = 0)

Since the ε-agent buys and sells εj units of each asset j, asset market clearing (3∗ )
is as before. But since he delivers fully εj Rsj on his promises,
P and gets delivered only
εj Ksj (ε)Rsj , on net he injects the vector of commodities j∈J εj (1 − Ksj (ε))Rsj into
the economy in each state s ∈ S. This explains (2∗ ). Finally, condition (4∗ ) says that
delivery rates must recognize the external agent. (The condition when denominator
= 0 is now reduced to the trivial case when promises ps (ε) · Rsj = 0, hence when
Ksj (ε) is irrelevant.)
An E = hp, π, K, (xh , θh , ϕ, D)h∈H i is called a trembling hand equilibrium if there
exists a sequence of ε-trembling hand equilibria E(ε) with ε → 0 and E(ε) → E.
Notice that the external agent boosts the delivery rate Ksj (ε) above the level
achieved by the real agents h ∈ H in the ε-economy (unless they too are fully delivering, or not selling). As ε → P
0, this boost disappears for assets that
P are positively
h
traded in the limit. But if εj / h∈H ϕj (ε) does not go to zero and h∈H ϕhj (ε) > 0
for all ε, the limiting rates Ksj will be boosted (unless there is no default by the real
agents).
We could have imagined an external agent who delivers only 70% of his promises,
instead of 100%. It is clear that any “100% reÞned equilibrium allocation” is a “70%
reÞned equilibrium allocation,” thus explaining why our choice of 100% deliveries
gives the sharpest reÞnement.
In our deÞnition of equilibrium, there is one price for each asset, including those
assets that are not traded. There is therefore no possibility for price taking agents
to oﬀer diﬀerent prices with the hope of luring a better selection of sellers.12 We
12
Putting the matter still diﬀerently, we regard an asset or contract as setting out the obligations of
the seller, including the penalties if he fails to deliver, and the quantity limitations on his other sales.
The price of the contract is set by competition between sellers and buyers, that is, by the market.
Agents need only think about one prevailing price for each contract. In the Rothschild—Stiglitz view,
the price is one of the terms of the contract. In this view, there is no such thing as a single contract;
there are as many contracts as there are prices. Notice also that the Rothschild—Stiglitz view must
regard market clearing as one of rationing. At most prices, the contract will not be traded, because
either supply or demand is zero, and the other side of the market is rationed. This point of view
has been admirably expressed by Gale. In our view competitive equilibrium should be deÞned by a
single price at which both supply and demand are equal (possibly both zero), as long as expectations
at that price are set at rational levels.
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can interpret this situation in several ways. Suppose that buyers are aware of the
composition of sales at the market prices, and perhaps of the composition of sales at
prices a penny oﬀ from market prices. But they lack the knowledge or computing
power to infer what the composition would be at prices far from market. They might
therefore presume they will get the same selection of sellers no matter what price
they quote, giving them no incentive to deviate from market prices. Alternatively, a
buyer might understand full well the composition of sales, but he should make the
cautious assumption that he alone cannot serve all the potential sellers, and that he
is likely to be reached Þrst by the sellers who are most anxious to sell, that is by
the sellers who have the lowest reservation price for the asset. Thus again the buyer
expects the same selection of sellers as elicited by the market price, and is left with
no incentive to deviate from the market price.
In Sections 10 and 11, on the endogeneity of the asset structure, and in our sequel
paper, we show that the equilibrium reÞnement plays a crucial role in determining
whether an asset j is positively traded (j ∈ A∗ ) or not (j ∈ A\A∗ ).

3.3

Agents on the Verge of Trading

Suppose utilities uh are diﬀerentiable, and suppose at a reÞned equilibrium (p, π, K,
(xh , θh , ϕh , Dh )h∈H ) ps · xhs > 0 for all h ∈ H and s ≥ 1. We can deÞne the marginal
utility of money in state s to each agent h by µhs = [∂uh (xh )/∂xs` ]/ps` for any ` with
xhs` > 0. The marginal utility of h of purchasing any asset j is then
M Ujh =

S
X
s=1

µhs Ksj ps · Rsj

and the marginal disutility of selling asset j is
M DUjh

=

S
X
s=1

psj · Rsj min

(

λhsj
, µh
ps · vs s

)

An agent is said to be on the verge of buying (selling) asset j if he is not buying
(selling) it, but would do so if the price π j were ever so slightly lowered (raised):
verge of buying: π j = M Ujh /µh0
verge of selling: π j = M DUjh /µh0
If, in the reÞned equilibrium, ps · Rsj > 0 and Ksj < 1, then we know that in
the perturbation some agent h was actually selling j and not fully delivering in state
s (otherwise Ksj = 1 on account of the external agent). It also follows that some
(other) agent was buying j (since markets clear in the perturbation and the external
agent buys and sells the same amount of asset j). Passing to the limit, we conclude
that at a reÞned equilibrium
π j = max{M Ujh /µh0 } = min{M DUjh /µj0 }
h

h
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with all j with 0 < Ksj ps · Rsj < ps · Rsj for some s ≥ 1.
In particular, it follows that our reÞnement uniquely speciÞes π j (from the verge
of selling condition) once we know all the ps and xhs . Furthermore, if in addition we
knew a priori the ratios Ksj /Ks0 j (for example Ksj = Ks0 j ) for all s ≥ 1, then from
the verge of buying equality we could deduce all the levels Ksj as well.
With active default, Ksj < 1 and so we may well have that Ksj µhs < λhsj /ps · vs <
µhs and so M Ujh < M DUjh , for all h ∈ H. Thus there may be room in between for a
price π j at which no agent would want to buy or sell asset j.

4

The Orderly Function of Markets with Default

Our Þrst goal in this paper is to establish that default is completely consistent with
the orderly function of markets. To that end we prove that under fairly general
conditions, reÞned equilibrium always exists in our model.
The universal existence of equilibrium is somewhat surprising because of the historical tendency to associate default with disequilibrium (or more accurately, to make
full delivery part of the deÞnition of equilibrium), as we have already remarked. Furthermore, endogeneity of the asset payoﬀ structure is known to complicate the existence of equilibrium with incomplete markets. But we show that no new existence
problems arise from the endogeneity of the asset payoﬀs due to default.
The universal existence of equilibrium with default is also surprising because the
pioneering papers placing adverse selection in a model of competition, by Akerlof
(1972) on the market for lemons, and Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) on insurance
markets, purportedly showed that adverse selection is quite commonly inconsistent
with equilibrium. We discuss Rothschild—Stiglitz in example B1.
We are now ready to state our main theorem, which is that GE(R, λ, Q) equilibrium always exists, even if we insist on the equilibrium reÞnement discussed in
Section 2.4.
HSJ

and Q ∈ RHJ
Theorem 1 For any λ ∈ R+
+ , a trembling hand GE(R, λ, Q)
equilibrium exists, where R+ = R+ ∪ ∞.
Proof Suppose Þrst that penalties are Þnite, λ ∈ RHSJ
.
+
(εj )j∈J À 0. For any small lower bound b > 0, deÞne
∆b =

(

∗

(p, π) ∈ RS+ ×L × RJ+ :

L
X
`=1

Fix a tremble ε =

ps` = 1 ∀s ∈ S ∗ ,

b ≤ ps` ∀s` ∈ S ∗ × L, and 0 ≤ π j ≤

1
b

)

∀j ∈ J .

P
0
Choose M large enough to ensure that: ||x||∞ > M ⇒ uh (x) > uh (2 h0 ∈H eh ) for
all h ∈ H. (By assumption, uh (x) → ∞ as ||x|| → ∞, so such an M exists.) Now
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S L × RJ × RJ × RSLJ : kxk
deÞne, for each h ∈ H, ¤h = {(x, θ, ϕ, D) ∈ R+
∞ ≤
+
+
+
P
0
h
h
h
H
h
M, θj ≤ 2 h0 ∈H Qj , ϕj ≤ Qj , and ||D||∞ ≤ ||Q||∞ ||R||∞ }. Let ¤ ≡Xh∈H ¤ .
Denote η ≡ (p, π, K, (xh , θh , ϕh , Dh )h∈H ) ∈ ∆b × [0, 1]S×J × ¤H ≡ Ωb .
Consider the map K̄b : Ωb → [0, 1]S×J deÞned by
X



h
ps · Rsj εj +
ps · Dsj










h∈H

X
,1
, if Rsj 6= 0
h 
K̄bsj (η) = min 
p
·
R
ε
+
p
·
R
ϕ


s
sj
j
s
sj
j





h∈H


1
, if Rsj = 0
∗×

for each s ∈ S, j ∈ J. Clearly K̄bsj is a continuous function.
Next, consider the correspondence ψ 0b : Ωb ⇒ ∆b deÞned by
(
X
X
0
(xh0 − eh0 ) + π ·
(θh − ϕh )
ψ b (η) = arg max p0 ·
(p,π)∈∆b

X X

+

s∈S h∈H

h∈H

h∈H



X
ps · xhs − ehs −
(1 − K̄bsj (η))Rsj εj  .



j∈J

Clearly this map is non-empty and convex-valued, and USC.
Finally for each h ∈ H, deÞne the correspondence ψ hb : Ωb ⇒ ¤h by

ψ hb (η) =arg max {wh (x, θ, ϕ, D, p) : (x, θ, ϕ, D) ∈ B h (p, π, K) ∩ ¤h }.
x,θ,ϕ,D

Notice that ψ hb is non-empty valued and convex-valued, thanks to the continuity and
concavity of wh , for all h ∈ H. To check that B h (p, π, K) ∩ ¤h is LSC, let pn , π n ,
n
K n → p̄, π̄, K̄ with p̄ À 0. Let (x̄, θ̄, ϕ̄, D̄) ∈ B h (p̄, π̄, K̄). Fix 0 < α < 1. Then
(αx̄, αθ̄, αϕ̄, αD̄) ∈ B h (pn , π n , K n )∩¤h for suﬃciently large n by the scaling property
of the budget set, because p̄s · ehs > 0 ∀s ∈ S ∗ . Since α was arbitrary, this shows
that B h (p, π, K) ∩ ¤h is LSC in (p, π, K) whenever p À 0. Since B h (p, π, K) ∩ ¤h is
clearly USC, ψ hb is USC by the maximum principle.
Let ψ b : Ωb ⇒ Ωb be the correspondence deÞned by
ψ b (η) = ψ0b (η) × {K̄b (η)}× X ψ hb (η).
h∈H

By Kakutani’s theorem ψ b has a Þxed point η b ≡ (pb , π b , K b , (xh (b), θh (b),
ϕh (b), Dh (b))h∈H ). To avoid notational
clutter, we
P
Psuppress the b.
Note that in state 0, p0 · ( h (xh0 − eh0 )) + π · ( h (θh − ϕh )) = 0 (since, given the
monotonicity of each uh , this equality holds for each h individually in his budgetset). It follows that the “price player” could not make the value of excess demand
(across
commodities and assets) positive in period 0. Suppose for some j ∈ J,
P
h
h
h∈H (θ j − ϕj ) > 0. By taking π̃ j = 1/b and π̃ i = 0 for i 6= j, it follows that
X
X
1X h
(θj − ϕhj ) +
p̃0`
(xh0` − eh0` ) ≤ 0,
b
h

`∈L
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h∈H

PL
for all p̃ ∈ Pb ≡ {q ∈ RL
+ : q` ≥ b ∀` ∈ L,
`=1 q` = 1}. Hence
X
(θhj − ϕhj ) ≤ b||e0 ||∞ .
h

P

Similarly, if h∈H (xh0` − eh0` ) > 0 for some `, then by taking all π̃ j = 0 and p̃0` =
1 − (L − 1)b and p̃0k = b for all k 6= `, we get
X

h∈H

(xh0` − eh0` ) ≤

(L − 1)b||e0 ||∞
.
1 − (L − 1)b

From the fact that K̄b Þxed K, and from the fact that agents have optimized so
h ≤ p · R ϕh , whenever R 6= 0 we get
that ps · Dsj
s
sj j
sj
X
h
ps · Dsj
ps · Rsj εj +
h∈H

Ksj =

Hence

X

h∈H

h
ps · Dsj
=

ps · Rsj εj +

X

h∈H

X

h∈H

ps · Rsj ϕhj

≤ 1.

Ksj ps · Rsj ϕhj − (1 − Ksj )ps · Rsj εj .

From optimization of monotonic utilities in the budget set, we get
X
X
h
ps · (xhs − ehs ) =
Ksj ps · Rsj θhj −
ps · Dsj
.
j∈J

j∈J

P
h
Adding over agents h ∈ H, and substituting the above expression for h∈H ps · Dsj
we get
X
X
X X
(xhs − ehs ) =
(1 − Ksj )ps · Rsj εj +
Ksj ps · Rsj (θhj − ϕhj )
ps ·
j∈J

h∈H

j∈J h∈H

X
≤
(1 − Ksj )ps · Rsj εj + J||R||∞ b||e0 ||∞ .
j∈J

P
Suppose h∈H (xhs` − ehs` ) − j∈J (1 − Ksj )Rs`j εj > 0 for some s ∈ S. Since we
are at a Þxed point, the price player cannot increase the value of excess demand in
state s by taking p̃s` = 1 − (L − 1)b, and p̃sk = b for all k 6= `. Hence
X
X
(xhs` − ehs` ) −
(1 − Ksj )Rs`j εj
P

h∈H

j∈J







X
1
≤
εj  + J||R||∞ b||e0 ||∞ .
(L − 1)b ||e0 ||∞ + ||R||∞

1 − (L − 1)b 
j∈J

We now let b → 0. We argue that π j must remain bounded as b → 0. If Qhj = 0
∀h, then replace π j with 1. Otherwise, if π j → ∞, any agent h with Qhj > 0 could
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replace his entire action by selling ∆ units of j, buying M (≤ ∆π j /L) units of each
period 0 good, and delivering fully. Since ehs 6= 0 for all s, and commodity price ratios
are bounded in each state, agent h canP
do this without incurring any default. But
0
h
this gives him utility that exceeds u (2 h0 eh ), which is more than he can possibly
be getting at the Þxed point (with all excess demands close to zero for small b), a
contradiction. Thus all asset prices are bounded.
Since all choices and all macrovariables are uniformly bounded for small b, we
h
can pass to convergent subsequences, obtaining Ē ≡ hp̄, π̄, K̄, (x̄h , θ̄ , ϕ̄h , D̄h )h∈H i as
a limit point. Taking the limit of all inequalities derived above, we conclude that
aggregate excess demand for commodities and assets is less than or equal to zero in
E. It follows that the limit price ratios p̄s` /p̄sk are bounded in each state s ∈ S ∗ . If
0 could have consumed
ps` /psk became unbounded as b → 0, some agent with ehs` >P
0
M units of commodity sk, obtaining more utility than uh (2 h0 ∈H eh ), for all small
P
0
b; but since excess demand goes to zero with b, xh < 2 h0 ∈H eh for small enough
b, contradicting that h has optimized. Thus the limiting p̄ À 0, and all agents have
positive income in every state in Ē. Thus individuals are optimizing in Ē on their
untruncated budget sets. (This uses the concavity of ω h and the fact that eventually
the constraints on x and θ are not binding in his budget set.)
Note Þnally that if all commodity prices are positive, there cannot be excess
supply in any commodity in Ē, otherwise the price player would be making negative
proÞts. For the same reason there cannot be excess supply of any asset j in Ē, unless
π j = 0. But then no agent would sell j unless λhsj Rsj = 0 for all s ∈ S. Without loss
of generality we may in this case take θhj = ϕhj = 0 for all h.
Thus we have shown that Ē is an ε-trembling hand equilibrium. Letting ε → 0
and taking limits we obtain a trembling hand equilibrium. This proves the theorem
for Þnite penalties λ.
If some penalties are inÞnite, we take limits of equilibria with increasing penalties.
Since all actions must stay bounded along the sequence (because Qhj < ∞), any cluster
point of these equilibria will serve as the desired trembling hand equilibrium..
¥
Our proof has used the fact that ϕhj ≤ Qhj by assumption. Later the Qhj will play
an important role as signals, but now the reader may wonder what would happen
if they were eliminated, or taken to be enormously large. Recall that there is a
pathology that occasionally occurs even when there is no default, for example in
the GEI model. Sometimes two assets j and j 0 that promise diﬀerent commodities
nevertheless become nearly equivalent at some spot prices (ps )s∈S because they then
promise nearly the same money. At these prices the number of independent assets
suddenly drops, and demand blows up as agents try to go inÞnitely long in asset j 0 and
inÞnitely short in asset j (or vice versa). This destroys the existence of equilibrium.
The bounds Qhj prevent this, as Radner (1972) long ago pointed out for the GEI
model.
In the GEI model without short sale constraints like the Qhj , equilibrium can only
be guaranteed if all the assets promise payoﬀs exclusively in the same good (say L)
in each state s ∈ S. (See Geanakoplos—Polemarchakis (1986).) The asset matrix R
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then is eﬀectively reduced to S × J dimensions.
Default provides another reason why two assets that make diﬀerent promises
might, given certain macro variables (p, π, K), actually deliver the same money in
every state. One should therefore wonder if default introduces additional diﬃculties
in proving the existence of equilibrium. We have just seen that in the presence of the
bounds Qhj it does not. Now we shall show that default also does not complicate the
existence picture without the bounds Qhj .
Theorem 2 Let all promises Rj be exclusively in good L for all s ∈ S and let
Rj 6= 0 for all j ∈ J. DeÞne GE(R, λ) = GE(R, λ, Q) with Qhj = ∞, ∀h ∈ H, j ∈ J.
P
HSJ
Then GE(R, λ) exists for any vector λ ∈ R+ with s∈S λhsj RsLj > 0 for all h ∈ H
and j ∈ J.
Proof Theorem 2 specializes the conditions of Theorem 1. Hence we have a GE(R, λ, Q)
equilibrium for all Þnite Q. Consider a sequence of equilibria, η(Q) = (p(Q), π(Q), K(Q),
(xh (Q), θh (Q), ϕh (Q), Dh (Q))h∈H ), where Qhj = Q ∈ N, for all h ∈ H, j ∈ J.
If there is a single Q with ϕhj (Q) < Q, for all h ∈ H, j ∈ J, then by the concavity
of each wh , η(Q) is a GE(R, λ).
Passing to a convergent subsequence if necessary, we may suppose that for all
h ∈ H and j ∈ J,
h
θhj (Q)
h ϕj (Q)
→ θ̄j ,
→ ϕ̄hj .
Q
Q
h

Moreover, we might as well assume that for at least one j and some h and h0 , θ̄j 6= 0
0
and ϕ̄hj = 1.
For notational convenience, we shall write Rsj and Dsj , instead of the more
accurate RsLj and DsLj , and we shall suppose that real default in each state s ∈ S
is measured in terms of the commodity bundle vs = 1L , which is one in the Lth
coordinate, and zero elsewhere. Since all assets are exclusively delivering in the Lth
good, no harm results from these simpliÞcations. Finally, w.l.o.g. take psL = 1 for
all s ∈ S.
Observe that for any h ∈ H, s ∈ S, j ∈ J, the level of default
h
dhsj (Q) ≡ [Rsj ϕhj (Q) − Dsj
(Q)]+ ≤

1 h
[u (e) − uh (eh )],
λhsj

whenever λhsj > 0, for otherwise agent h would have done better not trading at all.
P
0
(At any GE(R, λ, Q), xh ≤ h0 eh ≡ e.) Hence if ϕhj (Q) → ∞,
h (Q)]
[Rsj ϕhj (Q) − Dsj

ϕhj (Q)

=

h (Q)]+
[Rsj ϕhj (Q) − Dsj

ϕhj (Q)

=

dhsj (Q)
ϕhj (Q)

It follows that Ksj (Q) → 1 for all s ∈ S with Rsj > 0, provided that
P
h
h∈H θ j (Q) → ∞.
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→ 0.
P

h∈H

ϕhj (Q) =

Furthermore, since relative prices ps` (Q)/psk (Q) stay bounded,
X
X
h
Ksj (Q)Rsj θhj (Q) −
Dsj
(Q)
j∈J

j∈J

must stay bounded. Otherwise agent h would eventually be consuming a negative
quantity in state s, or a quantity exceeding the aggregate endowment es , contradicting
commodity market clearing.
Putting these last statements together, we must have that
X
X
h (Q)
Ksj (Q)Rsj θhj (Q) −
Dsj
lim

j∈J

j∈J

h

= Rs (θ̄ − ϕ̄h ) = 0,

Q

Q→∞

for all h ∈ H, s ∈ S.
h
Consider any h with ϕ̄h 6= 0, and hence θ̄ 6= 0. For any Q ≥ 1,
h

h

θ̂ = θh (Q) − θ̄ ≥ 0

ϕ̂h = ϕh (Q) − ϕ̄h ≥ 0.
At any large Q, the agent could feasibly have chosen
h
= Dsj (Q) − Rsj ϕ̄hj ≥ 0 for all j ∈ J.
D̂sj

With these choices he would pay exactly the same penalty as in the equilibrium n(Q).
He would receive exactly the same consumption at time 1 if Ksj (Q) = 1 for all j with
h
θ̄j > 0, and strictly more consumption otherwise. In order for him not to prefer this
deviation, we must therefore have
h

π(Q)[θ̄ − ϕ̄h ] ≤ 0 for all h ∈ H.
h

But since θ̄ and ϕ̄h are limits of GE(R, λ, Q) equilibrium portfolios,
X h X
ϕ̄h ,
θ̄ =
h∈H

hence we must have

h∈H

h

π(Q)[θ̄ − ϕ̄h ] = 0 for all h ∈ H.
It now follows that household h would still prefer this deviation unless ∀j ∈ J, ∀s ∈ S,
h

[Rsj > 0, and θ̄j > 0 for any h ∈ H] ⇒ [Ksj (Q) = 1].
i

Note Þnally that if ϕ̄hj > 0, there must be some agent i with θ̄j > 0, hence Ksj (Q) = 1
h

for all s ∈ S with Rsj > 0 and either θ̄j > 0 or ϕ̄hj > 0.
Replacing (p(Q), π(Q), K(Q), (xh (Q), θh (Q), ϕh (Q), Dh (Q))h∈H ) with
h

(p(Q), π(Q), K(Q), (xh (Q), θ̂ , ϕ̂h , D̂h )h∈H ) we get another GE(R, λ, Q) with ϕ̂hj (Q) <
Q for all h and j. (Notice that we are reducing sales and purchases only for assets
¥
with Ksj = 1, which therefore leaves the K unchanged.)
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5
5.1

Chain Reactions, Netting, and Supernetting
Chain Reactions

In modern Þnancial economies, agents often are long and short in many diﬀerent
assets. They rely on revenues from their loans to keep their own promises. But these
revenues are only as reliable as the loans other agents have made to yet diﬀerent
parties, thus opening the possibility of a chain reaction of defaults. If α defaults
against β, forcing β to default against γ, forcing γ to default against δ, then in our
deÞnition of equilibrium, α, β, and γ will pay default penalties, and the total utility
loss from defaults will be large. Curiously this phenomenon is at its most dangerous
when the Þnancial system is at an intermediate level of development, with smoothly
functioning markets that permit agents to go short, but without some Þnely tuned
assets, forcing agents to hold complicated portfolios to achieve the risk spreading
they desire.
Consider a world with four agents and three possible future events, each consisting
of many diﬀerent states of the world. Suppose β wants to consume in the Þrst event,
γ in the second event, and δ in the third event. Suppose agents β, γ, and δ have no
endowment in the future states. Suppose α wants to consume in the present, but has
a considerable endowment of goods in the future, except in one unlikely state ω in
the third event.
If there were an advanced Þnancial system of Arrow securities, agent α would in
eﬀect sell directly to each of the other three agents. For example, with just three
Arrow securities, each one paying oﬀ exclusively in a diﬀerent one of the three events,
agent α would sell the Þrst security to β, the second to γ, and the third to δ. Agent
α by himself would default in state ω, and he alone would pay a default penalty.
Suppose, however, that in a less advanced Þnancial system there are again three
securities available. R123 promises 1 dollar in every state, R23 promises 1 dollar in
(every state in) events 2 and 3, and R3 promises 1 dollar in (every state in) event 3.
Then in equilibrium we could expect α to sell R123 , β to buy R123 and to sell R23 ,
γ to buy R23 and to sell R3 , and δ to buy R3 . In the bad state ω in event three,
the chain of defaults indicated above will take place. The penalty that α pays for
starting the chain reaction may be very small compared to the total penalty incurred
by the rest of the defaulters.
A diagram may make the situation clearer.
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State
space

Asset
R123

Promises
R3
R23

1

1

0

0

2

1

1

0

3

1

1

1

Figure 2
Notice that the asset span is exactly the same as with the three Arrow securities.
What makes the chain of defaults possible is the interlocking asset trade, with investors receiving and delivering in a long chain, in some state. With Arrow securities
this chain would never reach more than two links and one default.
One way around these chain reactions is to encourage market intermediation that
nets payouts.

5.2

Netting

Consider the variation of our GE(R, λ, Q) model in which an agent’s purchases and
sales of any given asset j are netted, so that he is deemed to have purchased (θj −ϕj )+
and sold (ϕj − θj )+ .
One can go a step further and consider supernetting across diﬀerent assets that
an agent has traded in.13 Now deliveries are no longer made separately on each asset,
but there is one combined payment in every state s ∈ S.
Netting and supernetting curtail chain reactions, but they are diﬃcult to implement in practice, though they are becoming more common. It is interesting to note
that netting destroys the convexity of the budget set, since we must have
X
X
h
ps · Dsj
≤
Ksj ps · Rsj (θhj − ϕhj )+
ps · (xhs − ehs ) +
j∈J

j∈J

for all s ∈ S. In our working paper [–] we show nevertheless that reÞned equilibrium
exists with a continuum of agents.

6

The Economic Advantages of Intermediate
Default Penalties with Incomplete Markets

There are four fundamental drawbacks to reducing the default penalties λ so far that
some agents choose to default in at least some states in equilibrium: (1) creditors,
13

Institutionally this may be regarded as a clearinghouse.
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rationally anticipating (on account of direct and indirect reasons) that they might not
be repaid, are less likely to lend; (2) borrowers may not repay even in contingencies
that have been foreseen, and even though they are able; (3) imposing penalties is a
deadweight loss; (4) the default of unreliable agents imposes an externality on reliable
agents who, because they cannot distinguish themselves from the unreliable agents,
are forced to borrow on less favorable terms.
Akerlof regarded the fourth (externality) cost of default as so important that
for this reason alone he suggested it would always be worthwhile to reduce default
by imposing penalties on defaulters. By analogy one could ask manufacturers of
products to issue guarantees to replace any defective parts, and in addition to pay
for all damages caused by defective parts.
Our second goal in this paper is to show that despite myriad reasons why default
is socially costly, the beneÞts from permitting some default often outweigh all of these
costs. The beneÞts from allowing default are basically twofold, and both stem from
the fact that markets are incomplete to begin with. First, an agent who defaults
on a promise is in eﬀect tailoring the given security and substituting a new security
that is closer to his own needs, at a cost of the default penalty. With incomplete
markets one set of assets may lead to a socially more desirable outcome than another
set. Second, since each agent may be tailoring the same given security to his special
needs, one asset is in eﬀect replaced by as many assets as there are agents, and so
the dimension of the asset span is greatly enlarged. A larger asset span is likely to
improve social welfare (although this gain must be weighed against the deadweight
loss of the default penalties that are thereby incurred). In short, permitting default
allows for a plethora of additional assets that do not have to be speciÞed in advance.
Each agent can tailor the simple standard contract to Þt his idiosyncratic situation.
A third beneÞt from allowing default, which is closely related to the Þrst two,
is that when there is no netting, agents can go long and short in the same security,
thereby doubling their asset span. We make use of this in the following example.
(The examples could be presented with netting, or supernetting, but then we would
need more assets and a more cumbersome analysis to make the same points.)
Let there be three agents and S = 3 states of nature, let there be one good in
each state, L = 1, and suppose agents have no utility for consumption at t = 0. Each
agent has the same utility
u(x1 , x2 , x3 ) =

3
X

log(xs ).

s=1

The endowments of the agents are
 
 
 
0
1
1
e1 =  1  ; e2 =  0  ; e3 =  1  .
1
1
0
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We take the collection of
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0
0
1
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1
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≡ 1 ; R2 =
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0
0
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We take default penalties to be one of three types:
λhsj = ∞, ∀h, s, j; \

λhsj = λ > 0, ∀h, s, j; or
½
∞ if ehs = 1
h
.
λsj =
0 if ehs = 0

We take
Qhj = ∞ ∀h, j.
Notice that the Þrst two penalties are completely anonymous, since they are the same
whatever the name of the defaulter, and whatever his circumstances. The last penalty
type is inÞnite when agents have the resources to pay, and 0 otherwise. They do not
depend on the name of the defaulter, but they do depend on his circumstances; they
require more information to carry out. The information required is identical to the
sort of information an insurance company must obtain to verify that an accident has
occurred. Indeed in our sequel paper we shall use these penalties precisely in order
to render insurance a special case of default.
It is very important to observe that all these examples satisfy the assumptions of
Theorem 2.14 Here we can be sure a reÞned equilibrium exists. In our calculations we
shall often be able to show that there is a unique equilibrium satisfying the “on the
verge” condition. Since reÞned equilibria must also be on the verge, we can conclude
that the “on the verge” equilibrium must be a reÞned equilibrium, sparing us the
tedious computations of the ε-trembles.
Version A0: Arrow Assets: Pure Promises, InÞnite Penalties, and InÞnite
Quantity Constraints
The Arrow—Debreu equilibrium in our example can easily be calculated as p =
(1, 1, 1) and xh = (2/3, 2/3, 2/3), ∀h ∈ H. It can be implemented as a GE(R, λ, Q)
if A consists of the three Arrow assets j = 1, 2, 3. Let Rj = 1j , where 1j is the jth
unit vector, be the pure promise for state j, and let the default penalties and sales
constraints be set at inÞnity, λhsj = Qhj = ∞, ∀h ∈ H, s ∈ S, j ∈ J. The equilibrium
is given by (p, π, K, (xh , θh , ϕh , Dh )h∈H ) where p = (1, 1, 1), π = (1, 1, 1), Ksj = 1,
h = 1/3 if h 6= s = j,
∀sj, xh = (2/3, 2/3, 2/3), θh = 2/3 · 1h , ϕh = 1/3 · eh , and Dsj
and 0 otherwise.
14

Actually log(x) is not continuous at 0, so by “log x” we really mean log x =
ln x if x ≥ δ
where ln x is the conventional logarithm base e, for some very small
1
x + ln δ − 1 if 0 ≤ x ≤ δ
δ
δ > 0.

½
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In the GE(R, λ, Q) equilibrium just described, the volume of trade is 2/3 in each of
the three asset markets. Notice that there is some trivial multiplicity in the equilibria,
since agents could engage in wash sales and buy and sell the same asset. We could
instead have taken θh = (2/3, 2/3, 2/3), ϕh = eh , which has volume of trade equal
to 2 in each of three asset markets. However, with the tiniest of transactions costs,
wash sales would be eliminated, and the volume of trade would fall to 2/3.
Version A1: The Optimal Default Penalty with Incomplete Markets
In Version A0 we found that setting λhsj = ∞ gave a Pareto eﬃcient outcome,
because it eliminated default. Setting λhsj = λ < ∞ would have led to a Pareto
worse outcome. Nevertheless, we shall argue in this section that when markets are
incomplete, it is often better to set intermediate default penalties. In Version A0,
markets for risk sharing were eﬀectively complete.
Consider the economy as in A0, but with only one asset R0 = (1, 1, 1). Suppose that the reason for default cannot be observed, so λhsj = λ, ∀h, s, j. Agents
who promise delivery but do not have the good will default and suﬀer the penalty.
Anticipating this they will make fewer promises, and risk-sharing will be reduced.
We can calculate the equilibrium and agent utilities for any value of λ ∈ (1, ∞).
When λ ≤ 0 buyers realize that sellers will not deliver anything, so demand will be
zero and equilibrium will involve no trade. When λ → ∞ buyers will anticipate full
delivery, but sellers will realize that with probability 1/3 they will not be able to
avoid a crushing penalty, and so again equilibrium trade goes to 0. By setting an
intermediate level of default penalties we can make everybody better oﬀ. We graph
the situation schematically in welfare space:

W 2 = U2 _ (default)

Arrow-Debreu equilibrium

= * = 6/5

< 1 or

=
W 1 = U1 _ (default)
Figure 3
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In our equilibrium diﬀerent sellers default diﬀerently. The buyers of the asset
receive the average deliveries of all the sellers. When λ ≥ λ∗ = 6/5, sellers in their
good states deliver fully, and sellers in their bad state default completely. Thus our
example illustrates the pooling aspect of assets, namely that investors buy shares of
a pool of individually sold promises.
At λ = 6/5, x1 = (1/3, 5/6, 5/6), x2 = (5/6, 1/3, 5/6) and x3 = (5/6, 5/6, 1/3),
θh = ϕh = ϕ = 1/2 ∀h and Ksj = K = 2/3 ∀s. By buying and selling 1/2
unit of the asset R0 , agent h gains 1/3 = 2/3(1/2) = Kθh when s = h and loses
1/6 = 2/3 · 1/2 − 1/2 = Kθh − ϕh in the two states s 6= h. Agent h delivers fully
when s 6= h because his marginal utility of consumption after delivery is 1/(5/6) =
6/5 = λ∗ . When s = h, agent h defaults completely since his marginal utility of
consumption 1/(1/3) = 3 > λ∗ . Since for any s ∈ S we have 2 agents with h 6= s,
Ks0 = 2/3. Thus the asset promise R0 = (1, 1, 1) actually delivers (2/3, 2/3, 2/3) per
unit promise. Agent h = 1 delivers 1/2 · (0, 1, 1), agent h = 2 delivers 1/2 · (1, 0, 1),
and agent h = 3 delivers 1/2 · (1, 1, 0). The reason each agent buys and sells only
1/2 a unit of asset R0 instead of a full unit to get to the Arrow—Debreu allocation
is that the sale of ϕ units of the asset is accompanied by the loss of ϕλ utiles for
the inevitable default in state s = h. The marginal utility from buying the asset is
(2/3)(6/5)+(2/3)(6/5)+(2/3)·(3) = 18/5; the marginal disutility from selling is also
(6/5) + (6/5) + (6/5) = 18/5. (It is therefore more convenient to take π 0 = 18/5.)
A consequence of pooling is that the volume of trade is high. In equilibrium (when
λ = 6/5), each agent sells 1/2 unit of the asset, giving a total volume of trade equal to
3 · 1/2 = 3/2, much greater than the volume of trade per asset in the Arrow—Debreu
equilibrium.
When 1 < λ < 6/5, agents default in every state, delivering nothing in their bad
state and delivering D(λ) only up to the point where the marginal utility of consumption equals λ in their good state. The reader can verify that K(λ) = (6λ−6)/(4λ−3),
D(λ) = 3 − (3/λ), ϕ(λ) = (4/3) − (1/λ), and x0 (λ) = (2(1 − (1/λ)), 1/λ, 1/λ), etc.
Clearly as15 λ → 1, x0 (λ) → (0, 1, 1), D(λ) → 0, and K(λ) → 0. (Asset trade ϕ(λ)
does not go to 0 as λ → 1 because the log utility is −∞ at zero consumption.) as
λ ↑ 6/5, ϕ(λ), D(λ), and K(λ) are monotonically increasing, as is the utility of Þnal
consumption.
For λ ≥ 6/5, the agents always deliver if they have the goods on hand. Thus
Ks0 is maintained at 2/3, but asset trade again begins to drop because the inevitable
punishment makes selling less attractive. The formulas are messy and we do not
bother to present them here. An increase in the penalty rate beyond λ = 6/5 does
not improve risk bearing (since ϕ begins to drop), and it also increases the deadweight
loss from punishing agents who cannot deliver anyway. It thus strictly lowers welfare.
Furthermore, observe that as λ rises from 1 to λ = 6/5, the deadweight utility
loss from default
10
4
λϕ + 2λ(ϕ − D) = λ − 1 − λ + 4 = 3 − 2λ
3
3
15

Recalling that log x = ln x only for x ≥ δ, we really require 2(1−(1/λ)) ≥ δ, that is, λ ≥ 2/(2−δ).
By taking δ small, 2/(2 − δ) is just about 1.
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actually falls, to 3/5. Since the allocation is improving, and the default penalty
is falling, we deduce that λ∗ = 6/5 leads to the Pareto best outcome among all
economies with λhsj = λ.
Example A1 illustrates that the optimal default penalty might be low enough to
encourage some real default, and the attendant deadweight loss, when markets are
incomplete. It also illustrates that the possibility of default makes the asset payoﬀs
endogenous, since we do not know before an equilibrium is calculated what the default
rates will turn out to be. If we change the utilities or endowments of the agents, or
the default penalties, the equilibrium will change, the default rates will change, and
the asset payoﬀs will be diﬀerent.

7

Transactions Costs and the Advantages of Pooling

Even if assets and penalties could be chosen simultaneously, there is good reason to
suppose that not every Arrow security would be actively traded. In practice, that
would be much too costly.
If every agent tried to market a personalized asset, tailor-made to his needs, buyers
would be confronted with a bewildering array of choices. The information processing
and evaluation costs would be prohibitive, forcing each buyer to consider only a few
of the assets. Trading costs would also be high because every market would be thinly
traded, with only a few buyers and just one seller.
In our working paper [–] we formalized some of these costs. We supposed that
there areP
liquidity P
costs of selling or buying which decline in the volume of total trade
θ = ϕ = h ϕh = θh , but increase in the amount θh or ϕh of individual trade. We
also supposed that there is a further Þxed “information-evaluation” cost of buying an
asset that increases in the variance of K. Whatever the precise formulation of these
costs, it is evident that there can be tremendous eﬃciency gain to pooling. Buyers
are spared evaluation costs and sellers reap the beneÞts of liquid markets.
In the real world, promises are indeed standardized, enabling liquid markets, even
though deliveries are idiosyncratic. Thus two agents take out the same insurance
policy, under the same terms, even though it is perfectly understood that payments
on each will come in diﬀerent states of the world. We present a concrete example to
illustrate ideal pooling, and to show how our model of default encompasses insurance.
The example shows that in some cases the Arrow—Debreu equilibrium can be achieved
with just one liquid asset, instead of many thinly traded Arrow assets.
Version A2: The Advantages of Standardized Pooled Assets
Consider the economy described in Section 7 with H = {1, 2, 3} and with just one
asset R0 = (1, 1, 1). Suppose that the default penalties are
½
∞ if s 6= h (i.e., if ehs = 1)
h
λsj =
0 if s = h (i.e., if ehs = 0)
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that is, default penalties are inÞnite when agents have the resources to pay, and 0
otherwise. We might interpret state s as the state in which a bad accident happens
to agent h = s.
Let π 0 = 3, p = (1, 1, 1). Agent h buys and sells 1 unit of the asset, delivering
fully when his endowment is 1, and defaulting completely when his endowment is
0. The upshot is that on net, agent h has eﬀectively bought an insurance contract.
Indeed every agent has formally obtained the same insurance contract (by virtue of
making identical asset trades) but each has insured his own idiosyncratic risk.
Since in every state two agent types deliver and the other type defaults, Ks0 = 2/3,
∀s ∈ S. Consumption by h in the state s = h where he has no endowment is thus
Ks0 θhs0 Rs0 = (2/3)(1)(1) = 2/3. Consumption in the other states where he delivers
h = 1 + 2/3 · (1)(1) − 1 = 2/3. We verify that this is a
is ehs + Ks0 θhs0 Rs0 − Ds0
GE(R, λ, ∞) equilibrium
by noting that the
¡ ¢marginal
¡ ¢ utility
¡ ¢of owning an extra unit
PS
3 2
3 2
3 2
of the asset is s=1 (∂u/∂xs )Ks0 Rs0 = 2 3 + 2 3 h+ 2 3 , iwhich is equal to the
P
∂u
, λhs0 = 32 (1) + 32 (1) + 0,
marginal disutility of selling the asset Ss=1 Rs0 min ∂x
s
where 3/2 = [d log(2/3)]/dx is the marginal utility of consumption in each state.
Version A2 seems at Þrst glance like an artiÞcial example,because the penalties
themselves are idiosyncratic. But, as we said earlier, they are no more idiosyncratic
than insurance contracts.

8

Endogenous Asset Structures without Transactions Costs

We have argued that with transactions costs it is eﬃcient for trade to be conducted
via a relatively small number of liquid assets. We now show that, even without
transactions costs, the market forces of supply and demand will force all trade into
a small subset of the available assets. This is so even though we conÞne attention
to reÞned equilibria in which optimistic expectations tend to boost trade in every
market.
In some contexts it has become customary to think of endogenizing the asset
structure by allowing atomic agents to invent new assets (often one at a time) to
upset a prevailing equilibrium. These asset-creating agents are hypothesized to be
motivated by payoﬀs that might depend on the perceived volume of trade which
would take place in their new asset if no other prices changed (or in the new trading
equilibrium after all prices equilibrated), or in some other way on their perceived
proÞts from introducing the new asset. When the status quo assets are chosen so that
none of these agents has an incentive to introduce a new asset, the asset structure is
said to have been endogenously determined. This approach to endogenizing the asset
structure inevitably involves a combination of price taking behavior and oligopolisticNash thinking on the part of the asset-creating agents.
By contrast we follow a relentlessly competitive approach to the problem of endogenous assets. Every agent is a price taker. An asset is endogenously missing in
our approach if it is not in A∗ , i.e., if there is a price at which no agent wants to sell
or buy it.
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Recall that an asset is speciÞed not just by its vector Rj of promises across states,
but also by the associated default penalties λhsj , and quantity constraints Qhj . If the
government could simultaneously and without limitations choose these parameters,
it would set them at the Arrowian levels: promises with full span, inÞnite penalties,
and nonbinding quantity constraints. Now we show the market would do the same.
Version A3: Arrow Securities Emerge When Default Penalties Are InÞnite
Consider our standard example with H = {1, 2, 3}, but with four assets Rj = 1j ,
j = 1, 2, 3, and R0 = (1, 1, 1). Let the penalties be λhsj = ∞ if j = 1, 2, 3, and
λhs0 = λ∗ = 6/5 for all h and s. Despite the fact that the default penalty for asset
0 has been chosen “optimally,” the unique equilibrium (ignoring redundant trades)
is the Arrow—Debreu equilibrium of Version A0, so that asset 0 is not traded at all.
The forces of supply and demand determine that the Arrow securities are traded and
other assets are not.
We elevate this example to a theorem:
Theorem 3 Let E = ((uh , eh )h∈H , (Rj , ((λhsj )s∈S , Qhj )j∈J )) be an economy which
includes all the Arrow securities: for each s ∈ S, there is an asset i = i(s) such
that RsLi = 1 and Rs0 `i = 0 otherwise, with Qhi = ∞ ∀h and λhsi = ∞ ∀h and
∀s. Then for any GE(R, λ, Q) equilibrium η = ((p, π, K), (xh , θh , ϕh , Dh )h∈H ), we
(1+S)L
such that (q, (xh )h∈H ) is an Arrow—Debreu equilibrium.
can Þnd prices q ∈ R++
Moreover, if λ À 0, no agent defaults on any actively traded asset in η, even if
there are assets j ∈ J with low λhsj . Finally, there is an equilibrium η 0 , possibly η
itself,with the same ((p, π, K), (xh )h∈H ) such that the only actively traded assets in
η 0 are Arrow securities.
Proof Let η be given. Let q0 = p0 and let qs = π i(s) (ps /psL ), ∀s ∈ S. Let
(1+S)L

vh (q) ≡ max{uh (x) : q · x ≤ q · eh , x ∈ R+

}.

Observe that Ksj = 1 for each asset j with λhsj = ∞ ∀h, s, if Rs 6= 0, since no
agent will default in the reÞnement and the external agent will be fully delivering. It
follows that by never defaulting, each agent h could, by selling and buying the Arrow
securities, achieve at least v h (q), that is,
uh (xh ) ≥ uh (xh ) − default penalty ≥ v h (q).
P
P
It follows that q · xh ≥ q · eh ∀h ∈ H. Since η is an equilibrium h∈H xh = h∈H eh .
Hence q · xh = q · eh ∀h ∈ H, and (q, (xh )h∈H ) is an Arrow—Debreu equilibrium, and
the default penalty actually borne by each agent h ∈ H is zero.
Clearly each agent is indiﬀerent to achieving xh via the actively traded assets in
η, or via Arrow securities. If every agent trades exclusively via Arrow securities, then
¥
supply will equal demand, and we achieve the desired equilibrium η0 .
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Theorem 3 shows that the market selects the Arrow promises in A∗ if default
penalties are inÞnite (for these promises). We have seen that with no penalties, A∗
will be empty. As penalties are made harsher, A∗ will tend to increase, provided
that all promises are available in A. The reason is that for every state s ∈ S, there
is likely to be some agent who knows his punishment will be relatively low in that
state. He will have incentive to sell the corresponding Arrow promise j and debase
its Ksj , and therefore its price π j . This will eﬀectively prevent agents intending to
deliver in state s from selling j. By raising the general level of default penalties, this
phenomenon is discouraged.

9

Endogenous Default Penalties When Promises
Are Incomplete

When all asset promises are available, the market should and will exclusively trade
promises with inÞnite penalties. Let us suppose that the set A contains only a
limited variety of promises, far short of a complete set of Arrow promises. Given
these limitations on promises, in Section 7 we were able to ask how severe the default
penalties should be to promote economic eﬃciency. Since our model allows for the
possibility that diﬀerent punishment regimes coexist at the same time, we can also ask
how harsh the punishment scheme will be that endogenously emerges in equilibrium.
For example, an agent could indicate his intention to perform a service, he could
orally commit to performing the service, he could put in writing that he promised
to perform a service, or he could draw up a contract with a lawyer announcing his
promise to perform a service. If all four of these promises are treated equally by the
courts, then there is no issue of selecting a punishment. But if the punishment in case
of default is diﬀerent for these diﬀerent manners of making the same promise, then
in eﬀect the parties to the agreement are choosing the severity of default penalties
attached to the promise. We shall now show that in our example, the forces of supply
and demand select the optimal default penalties.
Version A4: Endogenous Default Penalties
Consider the model of version A1 with only one asset promise R0 = (1, 1, 1) and
h
λs0 = λ∗ = 6/5, ∀h ∈ H and ∀s ∈ S. It is natural to regard the penalty λ∗ as
imposed by a beneÞcent and knowledgeable government. But we may also regard λ∗
as emerging from the equilibrium forces of supply and demand.
Now let there be a Þnite number of additional assets Rj , all making the same
promises Rj = (1, 1, 1), but with default penalties λj = λhsj for all h ∈ H, s ∈
S, ranging at intervals of λ∗ /100 from 0 to 100λ∗ . The symmetry of the utilities,
endowments, and penalties guarantees (by symmetrizing the proof of Theorem 2) that
a symmetric, reÞned equilibrium must exist. (Symmetry means that ϕhj = θhj = ϕj
for all h ∈ H and j ∈ J.) We shall now show that despite the myriad of available
assets, in every (symmetric) reÞned equilibrium, all trade will be conducted in the
assets j for which λhsj = λ∗ . We begin by describing an equilibrium of this type, and
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then we show it is essentially the only (symmetric) equilibrium satisfying the “on the
verge” condition.
The equilibrium will involve exactly the same prices, delivery rates, trades, and
consumption as described in example A1 for the case λ = λ∗ = 6/5. There we
found that x1 = (1/3, 5/6, 5/6), x2 = (5/6, 1/3, 5/6), x3 = (5/6, 5/6, 1/3), and ϕhj∗ =
1/2 for all h, and Ksj ∗ = 2/3 for all s. We must now extend that equilibrium to
deÞne prices π j and delivery rates Ksj for all the new assets. The “on the verge”
condition uniquely speciÞes all these (π j , Kj ) for j 6= j ∗ . Set π ∗ = 18/5, and set
π j = min{λj , 6/5} + min{λj , 6/5} + min{λj , 3} for j 6= j ∗ , which is the marginal
disutility of selling asset j. At these prices agents are just indiﬀerent between selling
j and j ∗ , so it is optimal to supply zero of j. Recall in example A1, π j ∗ = 18/5 =
the marginal utility of buying or selling asset j ∗ .
The marginal utility of buying asset j must be equal to (18/5)/π j ∗ = 1, i.e.,
6
5 Kj

+ 65 Kj + 3Kj
= 1.
πj

Hence Kj = (5/27)π j for all j ∈ J.
By concavity, since the Þrst-order conditions are satisÞed, each agent is indeed
maximizing by trading exclusively via asset j ∗ .
Having speciÞed the prices π j and delivery rates Kj for all the assets, we note
that in equilibrium there is active trade only in asset j ∗ (aside from trivial wash
sales in assets j with λj > 0 and Kj = 1). For 6/5 < λj < 3, no agent will
deliver anything on asset j in his bad state, since he consumed 1/3 and 3 > λj .
Hence if j is actively traded, Kj ≤ 2/3, contradicting our formula Kj = (5/27)π j =
(5/27)(6/5 + 6/5 + λj ) > 2/3. If λj < 6/5, and yet consumption in the good state is
5/6, then no agent who actively sells j will deliver anything on j in any state. Hence
if j were active Kj would be zero, contradicting our formula for Kj .
We have thus displayed an equilibrium in which (almost) any default penalty
is available, yet only a single one (namely the Pareto eﬃcient penalty) is used in
equilibrium.
We now argue that there can be no other reÞned (symmetric) equilibrium. In any
(symmetric) equilibrium we have consumption x1 = (2x, 1 − x, 1 − x), and similarly
x2 = (1 − x, 2x, 1 − x), and x3 = (1 − x, 1 − x, 2x). If x = 1/6, then all (π j , Kj ) are
deÞned, as in the last paragraph, by the on the verge condition. If x > 1/6, then
agent 1 has delivered up to a point in states 2 and 3 where his marginal utility of
consumption 1/(1 − x) > 6/5. He would not have done that unless he was selling
an asset with default penalty λj ≥ 1/(1 − x) > 6/5. If asset j delivers fully in every
state, then it is irrelevant, since by symmetry each agent is buying and selling an
equal amount of it. But from the argument in the proof of Theorem 2, if the asset
did not fully deliver everywhere, then any agent buying and selling it would default
completely in at least one state. Since by symmetry every agent
³ buys and sells´ it,
2 1
1
1
+ 1−x
=
Kj ≤ 2/3. The marginal utility to purchasing asset j is at most 3 2x + 1−x
2 3x+1
3 (1−x)2x

1
1
3
= 1−x
+ (1−x)3x
< 1−x
(if x > 1/6) of utility in period 1. The marginal
1
1
1
3
disutility of selling asset j is at least 1−x
+ 1−x
+ 1−x
= 1−x
, a contradiction.

29

If x < 1/6, we shall show there can be no equilibrium price π ∗ for asset j = j ∗ .
1
1
The marginal disutility of selling asset j ∗ is 1−x
+ 1−x
+ 65 , since 1/(1−x) < 6/5 = λ∗ .
Hence, the marginal disutility of selling is less than 18/5. It also follows that every
agent would deliver in each of his two good states if he were selling asset j ∗ . Hence
Ks0 ≥ 2/3, ∀s ∈ S, by our equilibrium reÞnement. The marginal utility of buying
1
1
1
+ 23 1−x
+ 23 2x
. For x < 1/6, the marginal utility of
asset j ∗ is then at least 23 1−x
buying is always larger than 18/5, hence larger than the marginal utility of selling, a
contradiction.
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Endogenous Quantity Constraints: Signalling

We saw in Section 8 that the forces of supply and demand could endogenously select
unique default penalties that are active in equilibrium, out of an arbitrarily large array
of possibilities. Here we show an analogous result holds for quantity constraints. We
present a last example illustrating the theme from our sequel paper [–].
Version B
Consider our standard example, but now with 6 households whose endowments
5 = (0, 1, 0), and
are e1 = (0, 1, 1), e2 = (1, 0, 1), e3 = (1, 1, 0), e4 = (1, 0, 0), eP
6
e = (0, 0, 1). The utilities of all households are identical: u(x) = 3s=1 log xs . Their
default penalties are given by
½
∞ if ehs = 1
h
for all h ∈ H, s ∈ S, j ∈ J.
λsj =
0 if ehs = 0
All assets j ∈ J = {1, 2, ..., 100} entail the same promises Rj = (1, 1, 1), but diﬀerent
quantity constraints Qj = j/30.
We may think of households h ∈ {1, 2, 3} as reliable, since they will deliver in 2
out of 3 states j and h ∈ {4, 5, 6} as unreliable, since they deliver only in 1 state. The
model now clearly displays the potential for adverse selection, since the unreliable
have incentive to sell more of any asset, and therefore to be more than proportionately represented in the pool, thereby debasing the pool deliveries. Signalling one’s
reliability by selling an asset with a low quantity constraint, therefore has an important role to play. This is all the more so if an exclusivity constraint is imposed,
prohibiting households from selling more than one asset.
Rothschild and Stiglitz argued (in an oligopolistic version of this example) that
there might not be any equilibrium under these circumstances. But they showed that
if an equilibrium exists, it must be separating: reliable and unreliable households will
sell diﬀerent assets.
The exclusivity constraint renders the budget set nonconvex, thus preventing this
example from being covered by existence Theorems 1 and 2. Nevertheless, it can be
shown that reÞned equilibrium always exists, and is always unique, in such insurance
economies. (See Dubey—Geanakoplos [–].) In our numerical example, there is indeed
an equilibrium in which all the reliable households buy and sell asset 9 up to its
quantity limit Q9 = 9/30, while all the unreliable households buy and sell 30 units of
30

asset 100. Hence K9 = 2/3 = π 9 , and K100 = 1/3 = π 100 . Assets j ∈ {10, 11, ..., 100}
are priced so that the unreliable households are on the verge of switching to them.
Assets j ∈ {1, ..., 8} are priced so that the reliable households are on the verge of
selling them (unless Qj is too low, in which case Kj = π j = 1). For more details, see
[–].
The universal existence and uniqueness of the insurance equilibrium is made possible by our perfectly competitive framework. In Rothschild—Stiglitz an entrant could
upset a candidate equilibrium by introducing an asset with a new quantity constraint
and a new price, (Q, π). The entrant could persuade buyers that this contract would
yield a high K, thereby justifying its price and disrupting the old equilibrium. In our
example, every Q is already marketed and priced at equilibrium (by the reÞnement).
The “new” Q is a red herring. The real point of Rothschild—Stiglitz is that the entrant can quote a new price, which will attract a diﬀerent clientele, and thus justify a
diﬀerent K. Perfect competition does not permit agents to quote new prices – they
are all price takers.
We have in mind the huge, anonymous markets now becoming so common on
Wall Street. Mortgages today are promises sold by homeowners to banks, who then
sell them into mortgage pools (totalling around $3 trillion). The bank plays a minor,
administrative role, collecting payments and verifying the eligibility of the homeowners (according to criteria speciÞed by the pool, not the bank). The bank receives
a “servicing fee” for its eﬀorts, and passes the default and prepayment risk on to
the shareholders in the pool. The analysis therefore properly shifts from the one-onone interaction of banker and homeowner to the pool level of perfectly competitive,
anonymous, shareholders (lenders) and borrowers.
Imagine now that a little bank in Peoria decides to oﬀer mortgages at 6%, instead
of the prevailing pool rate of 7%. It Þgures to get a better clientele, attracting so
many new, reliable homeowners (who were not until then borrowing at all) that
the default rate would fall from 3% to 1%, thereby improving the net payoﬀ from
4% = 7% − 3% to 5% = 6% − 1%. In a massive market, we feel that the Peoria bank
will be sadly disappointed. It seems likely that its Þrst customers will be the old
homeowners who will jump at the chance to reÞnance their 7% loans into 6% loans.
The new homeowners, who found 7% too steep to borrow at all, will have much less
incentive to run to Peoria. But the little Peoria banker will not have the trillions
of dollars needed to give loans to everybody. He should cautiously assume that the
customers most likely to reach him before he runs out of money are no better on
average than those in the huge pool. This caution is embodied in our equilibrium
reÞnement.
Our reÞnement is simple enough so that equilibrium always exists and is easy to
compute. Yet it is strong enough to give a unique equilibrium, namely the separating
equilibrium. We quote from Dubey—Geanakoplos [–]:
Perfect competition not only simpliÞes the equilibrium, but also its reÞnement. In the contract theory literature, when two parties are in face-toface meetings, an extensive form game is created, in which the reÞnements
are vastly more complex. They require agents to engage in a long chain of
31

hypothetical reasoning about each other. For example, in the reÞnement
of Cho and Kreps [3], h must think about what j thinks about what every
other player k (including h himself) is thinking about, in order to deduce
whether j will be able to deduce who he is dealing with. It presupposes
common knowledge of private, individual characteristics; and calls upon
each agent not only to think through many iterations, but to believe that
others are doing likewise. Our reÞnement strains credulity less. There is
no hypothetical reasoning and no chain. Agents think only about the observable macro aggregates Kj . The concrete, inÞnitesimal actions of the
external agent are relevant only through their impact on the Kj ; indeed
their purpose is to render the Kj observable.
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